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It also means that the wishes of the Bamangwato, clearly 
expressed as they have been, are to be disregarded, who, in any 
case, are the Bamangwato to have wishes? Let them know 
their place. 
Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 
Editorial, 8 December 195 1. 
The viciousness of the attack can be ascribed to drink and the 
part played by women. 
PRO-DO 35/4149 (Draft Note for 
Cabinet by W A W Clark, 7 June 1952) 
Introduction 
Botswana in southern Africa is, as Pope John Paul I1 told the world on a September 1989 
stop-over, "an island of peace in a troubled sea". [l] Besides military incursions by its 
neighbours (in 1900, 1976-79, and 1985-88), there has been only one incident of civil 
violence leading to death over the course of the last century - the Serowe kgotla riot of 1952. 
The riot in the kgotla (public forum or courtyard) at Serowe, on Sunday 1 June, 1952, was 
the climax of ten days of unrest and a weekend of demonstrations. Six delegates of the 
Bangwato people had arrived back at Serowe on Wednesday 21 May from a futile trip to 
London. They had flown off to persuade the British government to restore to them their 
rightful Chief, Seretse Khama, who had been debarred from accession to the chieftainship by 
the fiat of a Labour government in March 1950. But the Bangwato delegates of 1952, led by 
Keaboka Kgarnane and Peto Sekgoma, were baulked by a new Conservative government 
which pre-empted their move by announcing that the ban on Seretse was permanent. The 
delegation had to return home empty-handed. Moreover, it had alienated Seretse himself, 
then living in exile in south London, by calling on him to divorce his English wife - and thus, 
supposedly, to remove the cause of his rejection by the British government. [2] 
The British colonial administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) seized the 
opportunity of dampening down Bangwato popular resistance to its diktat once and for all. 
The Conservative government had decided to go all out for the accession of their own 
candidate, Rasebolai Kgamane, as Chief. District Commissioner Batho of Serowe first 
refused the returning delegates permission to report back to the kgotla of the town. Then, on 
Thursday 22 May, he announced the "resignation" of Keaboka Kgamane as the interim 
leader of the Bangwato. The next morning the BBC overseas service announced an order-in- 
council to regulate the "Bamangwato succession". This was followed by protest meetings in 
the smaller kgotlas of the town's wards, where fears were voiced that the government was 
trying to reimpose, through Rasabolai, the rule of the much feared Tshekedi Khama, who had 
been forced to resign his twenty-five year regency for Seretse Khama in 1950. There was 
disorder in the national church on Sunday 24 May, when a leading supporter of Tshekedi was 
expelled by the congregation. On the Monday the District Commissioner, in his capacity as 
Acting Native Authority, addressed a large kgotla assembly of Bangwato men. Nearly the 
whole assembly rose and turned their backs on the speaker's rostrum. When opening prayers 
were called, two opposing preachers stood back to back, one facing the assembly and one the 
DC, chanting contrary prayers. The DC tried to address the kgotla against uproar: his 
interpreter eventually throwing down the loud hailer in disgust. At this point a large group of 
women marched into the kgotla, traditionally though not exclusively a male preserve, and 
threw taunts and insults at their white Chief on the platform. 
A kgotla meeting on Tuesday morning expressed the bitter disappointment of the people at 
the failure of their delegation to London, determined to stand by Seretse while he lived, and 
agreed to revert to the 1950 complete boycott of the colonial administration - i.e., suspension 
of the "tribal" mechanisms of justice and tax collection which supported colonial rule. These 
resolutions were incorporated in a memorandum that afternoon, addressed to the colonial 
administration and signed "Your obedient servants" by 68 leading Bangwato. 
The gauntlet had been thrown down, and the colonial administration determined on 
Draconian measures in response. On Saturday 31 May, DC Batho travelled round the town in 
a loud-speaker van, announcing bans on all meetings in kgotla, on ammunition permits for 
hunting, and on all drinking of alcohol (including corn-beer). Police then marched into the 
kgotla and arrested Peto and other leaders, who, however, were released next morning. 
Police reinforcements, brought by train across South Africa from the British colony of 
Basutoland, arrived in Serowe at 4.00 a.m. on Sunday morning. While a small number of 
Bangwato walked to communion service at the national church on the other side of town, a 
great crowd assembled in the kgotla for hymns and prayers of their own. [3] 
At this point the narrative becomes unclear because of conflicting, different sources. [4] 
There appear to have been two confrontations between the police and the crowd. First, there 
was a minor clash with demonstrators who refused to clear the kgotla after the morning 
service. A woman leader was beaten while assaulting a white policeman from Swaziland, 
and a man was permanently blinded by smoke from a tear-gas cannister. Then, after lunch, 
there was the major confrontation with lines of police standing next to their trucks in riot 
gear. A white-washed line had been painted in the dust across the mouth of the Kgotla as ne 
plus ultra for the Bmgwato. But the crowd, with women at the forefront, surged across the 
line with sticks and stones to attack the district officer, who was warning them off with a 
loud-speaker attached to a car battery. Tear-gas was fired into the crowd. While District 
Commissioner Batho stayed at the back near his dark blue Ford truck, BPX 66, District 
Officer Rutherford leapt into the front or on to the back of a police lorry which drove into the 
crowd and caused pandemonium to be let loose. One black policeman was killed as he fell 
off, or was dragged off, the lorry; some sources claim he was crushed under the wheels of 
another lorry following behind. Two other black policemen were certainly clubbed or stoned 
to death after being chased from the melee - one in nearby housing, and another after being 
chased for, maybe, a mile. Meanwhile, while District Officer Atkins faced the infuriated 
mob with considerable bravery - for which he was later given Britain's highest civilian 
award, the George Medal - the main body of police retreated on foot up and over the steep 
slopes of Serowe Hill, at the back of the kgotla. 
The outburst of violence in a normally peaceable civic society clearly stunned both 
Bangwato and British, and restrained further violence. Though a spate of arrests followed 
that week, for incitement, riot and murder, no Bangwato took to the use of any of the 
numerous firearms available in Serowe. Oral tradition tells of the restraint of a veteran of the 
Matebele Wars from grabbing his gun. [5] Meanwhile, High Commissioner Le Rougetel, the 
senior British official in southern Africa, insisted that no ammunition be issued to the police 
at Serowe, who were being strengthened by reinforcements being flown in from Southern 
Rhodesia as well as from Basutoland and Swaziland. 
Nine days later the Secretary and the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
made statements in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons, respectively, on the 
Serowe riot. The riot, they said, had all been the work of a minority (Keaboka, Peto, et al) 
playing on drunkenness and women in the crowd. Drink and women, retorted Jennie Lee, 
MP: Were the women drunk? The government explanation was most unclear. "Many of us 
were impressed by the members of the delegation to this country. They seemed responsible 
and, in fact, distinguished men, and therefore it is very hard for us to accept the impression 
given in the statement that this was just an unrepresentative rabble and that the women taking 
part were drunk." 
Two days after the parliamentary statements, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London 
received cabled intelligence ffom Pretoria: "Women were in state of extreme excitement but 
there is no evidence that this was due to drink." But no correction was made to Parliament. 
The men who ruled Britain, like the men who ruled Bechuanaland, seemed to find the 
1 combination of minority agitation, drink and women to be a perfectly adequate explanation 
of the otherwise inexplicable breakdown of moral fibre in Bangwato society. 
The ultimate cause of the Serowe riot of 1952 was, of course, the barring of Seretse Khama 
from rightful succession. Most Bangwato held, and still hold, that to be the sole cause of all 
the trouble between 1949 and 1956. However, successive British governments were obliged 
to gloss over this fact out of political expediency, and to find other causes. The Harragin 
Report of 1949 was officially suppressed because it would have revealed extraneous 
motivation of Seretse's ban coming from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Bechuanaland Protectorate officials were obliged to 
produce a string of alternative explanations for the continuing Bangwato political crisis, to 
divert attention away from Seretse Khama as an individual. 
Minority Agitation 
The basic tenet of official explanations of the Bangwato political crisis was that support of 
Seretse Khama was sectional and unrepresentative of the Bangwato people as a whole. The 
underlying purpose was to secure acclamation by the Bangwato of an alternative chief: 
under colonial law in Bechuanaland, a (Paramount) Chief had to be acclaimed by the tribe in 
kgotla as a legitimate keosi e kgolo. as well as being recognised as Native Authority by the 
colonial administration. Flying in the face of obvious majority support for Seretse - the 
legitimate heir by all established rules of primogeniture - the British, in effect, exacerbated 
and aggravated all the factors that they identified as alternative "causes" of the 1949-56 
political crisis. 
The first "cause" of the crisis was identified by historians within the colonial administration 
as a dynastic feud between royal houses. Seretse was the grandson of Khama the Great 
(d. 1923) by a wife who predeceased him; Tshekedi was the son of Khama by a wife who 
outlived him. The historian Anthony Sillery, first as Resident Commissioner of 
Bechuanaland and later as an Oxford academic, remained convinced that the tangled web of 
dynastic alliances dating back a century or more, to the time of Kharna's own father, was the 
key to an understanding of internal Bangwato conflict. This view, reduced to a crude 
historical determinism of irreconcilable hereditary factors by Sillery's superiors, was actively 
promoted by Tshekedi. But a check-list of Tshekedi's royal supporters shows them to have 
been motivated more by long-standing allegiance to Tshekedi, with youth or previous 
personal quarrels with Tshekedi, rather than family ties, predisposing other royals to vocal 
support for Seretse. [6] 
A second explanation for political crisis, also pressed by Tshekedi, was the cleavage between 
the dominant minority of "true" Bangwato clans and the subordinate majority of various 
"alied' or "allied" clans. The distinction had been used as a divide-and-rule ploy by the 
British against Tshekedi in the 1930s, but Tshekedi was now confident that this silent 
majority was backing him against Seretse. Again, Tshekedi was deluded: the subordinate 
chiefs and headmen of the "allied" clans who backed him were usually Tshekedi's place- 
men, some of them not even from the clans they claimed to represent. The "allied" tribes, 
notably Bakalanga, Bakhurutshe and Bokaa, proved, on the whole, to be the most persistent 
supporters of Seretse. [7] 
The third, linked, explanation offered by Tshekedi and picked up by successive British 
governments was that the June 1949 popular acclamation of Seretse and subsequent events 
were expressions of "mob rule". During the 1948-49 kgotla assemblies on his marriage and 
right to succession, Seretse had successfully played on majority support - up to four thousand 
men had risen for Seretse against fewer than forty notables already standing for Tshekedi, at 
the climactic moment on Wednesday 23rd June 1949. Tshekedi, echoed later by Winston 
Churchill as Leader of the Opposition at Westminster, dismissed the acclamation of Seretse 
as Chief as "mob rule" and purely "sentimental". The Labour government set up its Harragin 
Commission to prove that kgotla assembly was unrepresentative of the Bangwato as a whole, 
including "allied" clans. After the commission failed to supply the desired opinion, three 
British "observers" - a retired trade union leader, a professor of colonial history, and an 
independent MP - were sent out in 1951 to investigate Tshekedi's continuing contentions. 
(Tshekedi had been exiled from the Bangwato Reserve after resigning his Regency in 1950, 
but now claimed the right of return on the basis of majority support.) The "observers" 
convened sectional meetings in outlying areas and concluded that, while young pro-Seretse 
royals, led by Keaboka, held the centre, the majority in the Reserve was implacably hostile to 
Tshekedi. [S] 
The fourth line of explanation of the continuing crisis was arrived at reluctantly by the 
Labour government in 1950, and was c o n f i e d  by the "observers" in 195 1. It was that 
Tshekedi himself was the cause of the trouble. His enlightened but autocratic rule for so 
many years had alienated too many sections of the Bangwato. Tshekedi himself had pointed 
to the grievances against him of ex-servicemen and of younger age-regiments. 
Bechuanaland, in general, and the Bangwato Reserve, in particular, had supplied more men 
proportionate to able-bodied population than any other British-allied temtory in the Second 
World War. Many of the men in kgotla meetings were ex-soldiers wearing old uniforms - 
while in the 1952 riot the expertise of former members of army smokescreen units proved 
invaluable for evading the effects of tear-gas. Tshekedi feared that these old soldiers blamed 
him for the interminable official delays in payment of demobilization benefits. He also knew 
that age-regiments that had fought in the war, and the younger age-regiment of Seretse who 
had not been old enough to fight, bitterly resented their direction by Tshekedi into forced 
labour. They had been forced to work without pay between 1946 and 1949 on Tshekedi's pet 
project - Bamangwato College, set in the remote valley of Moeng. [g] 
We can elaborate further on the popular grievances identified by Tshekedi in latter-day 
opposition to his rule, in relation to the war effort and the more recent push to build the 
college at Moeng. Traditional tribute labour on royal fields had been revived and 
transformed into "warlands" cultivation during the Second World War. This gave a 
"peasant" grievance for women, children and the aged left on the lands by their migrant 
menfolk, particularly those on more productive lands for cultivation, such as the Bakalanga. 
On the other hand, obligatory levies of cattle - to raise £100,000 for the Moeng project - 
raised a "pastoralist" grievance against Tshekedi among older, more propertied households 
after the war. Peasant and pastoralist grievances had, in fact, come to a head in 1947 when 
John Nswazwi, a headman of the Bakalanga, "spoke out like a man and suffered as a 
scapegoaty' in objecting to Tshekedi's harsh enforcement of tribute and levies. [l01 
When Tshekedi and 242 male taxpayers - the "cream" of his tribal administration, plus 
household retainers - retired from the Bangwato Reserve into nearby exile in 1949-50, the 
British administration therefore did not rush to beg him to return, as he expected. The power 
vacuum at Serowe was filled by younger or disaffected notables who had not enjoyed 
Tshekedi's patronage. By the time the three British "observers" arrived in July 1951, there 
was clearly a "Big FiveY'in power, led by Keaboka. It was this "Keaboka crowd", expanded 
to include leading representatives of "allied" clans, which masterminded Bangwato affairs 
from the boycott of colonial administration in March-September 1950 up to the Serowe 
kgotla riot of June 1952. It saw itself almost in revolutionary terms as a provisional 
government awaiting the restoration of Seretse after the downfall of Tshekedi. [l l] It 
certainly played on popular fears of brigandage by Tshekedi's supporters, whose habit of 
riding round in blood-red (kgapamadi) trucks bristling with rifles led to a spate of scares. As 
a Serowe police official reported in August 1949: 
It would appear that quite a number of people are allowing their 
imaginations to run riot, and are convinced that when out 
walking in the village at night ... others are following with the 
intention of committing murder, and that the people who are 
following them must be the supporters of Tshekedi. [l21 
Such "great fear" of retribution by the once all-powerful Tshekedi helps to explain the 
popular instability which manifested itself in violent mass demonstrations against small 
numbers of "kgapamadi" who came to collect their personal possessions at Mahalapye and 
Serowe in July 1951. The British, however, arrested the leaders of Seretse's age-regiment as 
the agitators of events, rather than tackling the "Keaboka crowd" at the centre of Bangwato 
society. [l31 
Drink and Women 
It is against such a background of mass fear and possibly loathing against the figure of 
Tshekedi that one must consider explanations of the proximate causes of the 1952 Serowe 
Kgotla riot. Popular resistance to colonial rule cannot be separated from popular resistance 
to the rule of Tshekedi Khama, because after initial dramatic clashes the two systems of rule 
had become inextricably bound up with each other. The princely resistance of the 1930s had 
been reborn as popular resistance in the 1950s, after the accommodation of the prince and the 
alienation of the people in the 1940s. [l41 
This paper argues that the essential factor that led to the murderous riot of June 1952 was the 
decision of the British government a few months earlier to seize the initiative. It did so 
because of tactical and strategic errors by the "Keaboka crowd", which cut them off from 
Seretse's leading young supporters and from Seretse himself. Keoboka et a1 then indeed 
became desperate men, and saw their only option as the incitement of popular protest, 
canalizing deep-seated popular resentment against recent British rule. That resentment may 
well have had its origins against Tshekedi, but had become increasingly targetted directly 
against British rule since Tshekedi had been out of power for two to three years. This can be 
clearly seen by focussing on the issues of drink and women raised by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office explanation of the riot. 
The issue of alcoholic drink is relatively easily explained. Tshekedi had indeed tried to 
maintain the bans on brewing and drinking of spirits and corn-beer which his father, Khama 
the Great, had initiated in the previous century. Beer-brewing and drinking had come out of 
the closet with Tshekedi's resignation from the Regency in 1949-50. The riot of Sunday 
1 June 1952 followed within twenty-four hours of the District Commissioner's renewed ban 
on beer. That some men were still groggy, or even drunk, after a heavy Saturday night's 
drinking was hardly surprising - a combination of defiance of authority with depletion of 
stocks before police destroyed them. [l 51 
The issue of women's involvement in the unfolding of events between 1948 and 1952 is 
much more instructive about the nature and dynamics of Bangwato society. The first hint of 
a women's revolt against Tshekedi came in November 1948, when he made the claim that all 
male adult Bangwato (i.e. those with rights in kgotla) were opposed to Seretse's marriage. 
Seretse had just arrived in Serowe, and was being greeted by many women and children. The 
situation was repeated when Ruth Khama arrived in Serowe to join her husband in July 1949, 
by which time Tshekedi had concluded that Ruth, rather than Seretse, was his bitterest 
enemy. On 9 August, 58 women of Mahalapye got together to petition the Resident 
Commissioner on behalf of Seretse (and, therefore, on behalf of Ruth). They were led by 
Relathanye M Ikitseng, the wife of Manyaphiri, who continued to play such a part in the 
political crisis that perhaps we should refer to the Big Six, rather than Five, to include her. 
The petition first showed political acumen by deploring the influence of South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia on the whole issue. They admitted "slight fear of correct approach" to 
Seretse's European wife, but said "we have accepted Mrs Seretse as our Chieftainess, and 
this we showed when we gathered in the Chief S Kgotla with our school children. May we 
request that Mrs Seretse be handed over to us: we will teach her all our daily work as 
Africans" - though "queens have no heavy work to do". They disputed that Tshekedi had 
any rights, and asserted that "we are women, and we also put forward our request as such 
because a Chief is for us all and not for men only who speak in Kgotla; Seretse Khama is our 
only Chief." Some sense of prevailing bitterness against Tshekedi also comes through in the 
insults of Dichetse Balang, a 40-year old woman in Serowe, who complained of the colonial 
government "making Tshekedi proud, as he was born poor and not entitled to be Chief, and 
like a dog with a long tail, and that he did not know his grandfathers". 
Emotional scenes attended the temporary return of Seretse to his wife, on a flying visit to 
Serowe in April 1950, after Seretse's exile had been announced. Hundreds of women and 
some men sat around the Serowe house in silence. "Shyly a spokeswoman came to the front 
and stood near to Ruth. Raising her voice, she said: '... All the women and children want 
Seretse! Today we do not mind if the Government kills us all! Indeed, unless the 
Government let us have Seretse and his wife as our Queen, it has finished us! ' Old, skinny 
women began to sway in a ritual dance in front of husband and wife. The dancers' hands 
waved and they contrived to express in gesture a great longing for both Seretse and his wife. 
Then, as gently as it began, the dance ended." [l61 
It was during the political crisis that women began to take their places in kgotla. The 
assembly that greeted the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker, in 
February 1951, was "the first gathering at the kgotla ground where women attended in 
strength and gave the moduduetsa, the trilling fxe-bell greeting .... Little children sat at their 
mothers' feet and fiddled with toys made from cigarette-tin lids and packing-case wire". In 
the July 1951 disturbances, "the women took over the running from the men. Their 
screaming, wide-eyed participation in the disorders was the index of the tribe's desperate 
misery over the exile of Seretse." The women of Mahalapye, led by Mrs Manyaphiri, forced 
Tshekedi's local supporters to shelter in the police camp. Mr Manyaphiri and the men held 
their own meeting, which decided to let the Bo-Rametsana return to their homes, but were 
apparently overruled by the women, who mockingly demanded "Give us your trousers!" (17) 
When the three British "observers" appeared in Serowe, a special assembly of 1,200 to 1,500 
women was held, at the women's own request, to present their views. The "observers' (all 
three male, though a woman had originally been invited to join) were quite taken aback by 
the emotional scenes in Kgotla, and especially by the strength of the women's vituperation 
against Tshekedi. The message was put across that, if Tshekedi tried to return home, he 
would be subject to "acute personal danger, particularly from women". Certainly the women 
were prepared to resort to the "feminine" tactics of wailing and "rending their garments", but 
they were also prepared to resort to "masculine" tactics of physical violence as well. One 
symptom of Keaboka's weakness in government eyes was that "women, at the head of whom 
was the wife of Manyaphiri, headman at Mahalapye, sentenced a woman to receive corporal 
punishment in public and administered that punishment". It is scarcely surprising, therefore, 
that women played such a strong role in the Serowe kgotla riot of 1 June 1952. Of the 167 
people arrested after the riot, 40 were women. 48 people were eventually convicted, of 
whom at least six sentenced to one year's imprisonment were women. [l81 
Why were the women so strong in their support for Seretse and Ruth Khama? One is 
tempted to suggest that Ruth Khama was for African women the opposite of what she was for 
white men. For white men, a white wife for a black man turned topsy-turvy all assumptions 
that a man should dominate a woman, because white should dominate black. For African 
women, maybe, Ruth might have been a symbol of potential women's equality with men. 
What is very clear from all evidence is that strong support for Seretse and Ruth Khama was a 
continuing women's revolt against Tshekedi which was redirected against the colonial 
administration. Why? The chance remark in a Commonwealth Relations Office minute of 
January 1952 by W A W Clark, a friend and admirer of Tshekedi, is the only clue to be found 
in British government files: "The 'Mahalapye women' dislike Tshekedi because of his 
periodic campaigns to clean up the morals of the railway townships." [l91 This was no doubt 
Tshekedi's own view, and is coloured by Tshekedi's concept of the moral order into which 
women fitted. But it may be instructive to ask what was the "immorality" that Tshekedi had 
in mind and why this breakdown of the moral order did occur. 
Here we come back to the linked issues of women and drink. Tshekedi, a strong teetotaller, 
was cracking down on the "immorality" of beer brewing, which led to beer parties and so to 
other moral excesses and sins. (One suspects that the railway towns were centres of infection 
for the epidemic of venereal disease that rose with the tide of labour migration.) Beer- 
brewing parties were no doubt linked to the demands of labour migrants, who 
characteristically spent freely on their return, and even on their departure, by train. But, 
more importantly, beer brewing, as has been shown by a number of more recent studies of 
Botswana, was the characteristic way in which independent and semi-independent women 
could make a living. 
Much has been made in international aid circles in recent years of Female-Headed 
Households, a concept that can be traced back to Bond's work on Botswana agriculture in 
1974. The concept has even been conflated with that of "matrifocality', abstracted from ex- 
slave societies in the Americas. The concept has probably been overworked, and has put 
undue emphasis on gender rather than function in a household. In particular, it may have 
obscured the importance of age as well as gender in households, since female heads are 
usually older women while young, unwed women with children remain living with their own 
parents. But the concept of Female-Headed Households has brought attention to the 
widespread occurrence of independent and semi-independent women who, in the 
stereotypical "patriarchal" view of society, should not exist. When, then, did such 
independent women emerge? The importance of the women's revolt against Tshekedi is that 
it represents a mass outburst of such independent-mindedness on the part of women. And 
this outburst was a reaction, we suggest, to Tshekedi's restriction of the economic self- 
sufficiency of the growing numbers of independent and semi-independent women. [20] 
Why and when did this phenomenon of independent and semi-independent women emerge? 
The obvious general answer is that it was caused by the growth of male labour migration. 
Not only did adult men leave the country, and sometimes never come back, but the age of 
male marriage was raised till men had earned sufficient money from many years of labour 
migration. This not only increased the rate of unmarried motherhood, but also increased the 
incidence of widowhood as older husbands died long before their wives. Such trends were 
l evident in the Bakgatla Reserve of south-eastern Bechuanaland during the fieldwork of the 
anthropologist Isaac Schapera between 1929 and 1934, and were recorded by him in his 
classic Mam'ed Life in an African Tribe (since reprinted by Penguin Books many times), 
though as aberrations from the norm rather than as new social trends. Read from a modern 
perspective, Married Life reflects widespread marital crisis in the Kgatleng, and reads in part 
almost as a feminist tract, since Schapera was careful to base the book on the intimate written 
statements of younger women. Given that Bakgatla, straddled across the South African 
border, were locked into the South African economy as a labour reserve by the nineteen 
twentieslthirties, we may expect such trends to emerge among the Bangwato by the nineteen 
l ! thirtieslforties. Extensive labour recruitment in the Bangwato Reserve took off in 1933-34, when the boom in gold production on the Witwatersrand (caused by a guaranteed world 
price, however much output was raised) led to more intensive labour recruitment by the 
Native Recruiting Corporation at Palapye and Mahalapye, and the opening of offices at 
Francistown of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association to take labour from the 
northern Bangwato Reserve. By 1942-43 about 60 per cent of tax-payers (i.e. adult males) 
from the Bangwato Reserve (and other Reserves, too) were outside Bechuanaland - a little 
more than half of these in the army overseas, the rest mostly in South African mines. 
The trend towards Female-Headed Households helps to explain the increasing anomaly noted 
by the Census-takers of Bechuanaland - a so-called "masculinity ratio" that indicated almost 
equal numbers of males to females, or even an excess of males over females. This was in 
complete contrast to universal demographic trends elsewhere in the world, where females 
exceeded males in peasant societies but began to approach parity in industrial societies (so 
long as there were no wars). The excess of males over females appeared in the first Census _ 
of 1904, and was remarked upon during the Census of 1921. Khama III was asked to explain 
it, and answered that he had complained to the Resident Commissioner "about the number of 
young women that were leaving his country, and that this is now the result". When the 
Sample Census of 1956 had a similar result (1 15 males : 100 females), the social scientists 
conducting it offered the same answer of large-scale, unrecorded female out-migration, but 
also suggested an increase in the number of "widows" not counted by the Census. That, of 
course, was the problem, one of enumeration, whereby the Census count was linked to the 
exclusively male taxpayers' role. A cursory look at the figures indicates that, whereas in the 
early Censuses it was infant females that were under-enumerated (for reasons of low prestige 
in the household), in later censuses it was older females who were under-enumerated. The 
increase in infant enumeration may indicate the increasing status of females in Botswana 
society. [21] 
Casual observers sometimes remark on the relativelv equitable status of women in Setswana 
culture, by comparison with neighbouring countries - pointing to the precedents of property 
succession and child custody established in customary law since the nineteenth century. An 
alternative view links education with economic status in explaining the changing role of 
women in Botswana society. In a dry-land country, cultivation has always been marginal, 
and women's role as hoe-cultivators was therefore limited. The widespread, and by at least 
the 1930s universal, adoption of the plough for cultivation reduced the role of women in 
agriculture still further, as men nearly always until recently took the role of ploughmen with 
the oxen. Meanwhile, the growth of labour migration abroad intensified the role of boys, 
rather than men, in cattle herding. The result has been the anomaly in Botswana, as seen in 
universal and pan-Afiican terms, of an excess of girls over boys in school ever since the last 
century. [22] 
At this point we can no longer speak solely in terms of gender, but also of social class. It was 
upper-class boys who could go to school still young and climb the educational ladder higher, 
because of the family servants that looked after cattle for them. And it was upper-class girls 
who benefited not only from education but from legal reforms instituted by Khama 111, which 
gave them the right to inherit property, to be present in kgotla cases that directly concerned 
them, and even to be given personal cattle on marriage. [23] 
As for the poorer majority of women, they largely constituted the peasant component in what 
Jack Parson has called the "peasantariat" - the combined peasantry and proletariat of 
"worker-peasants" that kept the South African economy going. In other words, the largely 
female peasant part of the "peasantariat" subsidized the largely male migrant proletarian part 
of the "peasantariat", so that the cost of labour for capitalist employers in South Africa was 
even cheaper than that needed for the reproduction of the labour force. If that is so, then we 
can see the rise of independent, non-peasant women in Bangwato country as the further 
penetration of proletarianization into the "peasantariat". In that sense, the women's revolt 
against Tshekedi was not resistance but adaptation to proletarianization. As has been noted 
of England in the eighteen thirties and eighteen forties, outbursts of feminine assertion tend 
to happen at times of familial stress, when the effects of an industrial revolution have 
percolated throughout society as a whole. [24] 
Grasping the Nettle 
The Commonwealth Relations Office was well prepared for the new Conservative 
government in October 1951, urging decisive action to settle Bangwato affairs to exclude 
Seretse Khama permanently. The basic premise was that Seretse's return would "enflame ... 
white South African opinion" and make the South African government apply "overt and 
completely crippling sanctions" on the British territories of Basutoland and Swaz;iland as 
well as Bechuanaland. The new Minister, Lord Ismay, was much taken with the notion of 
the necessity of sacrificing one (good) man for "the future happiness and well-being of 
1,000,000 Africans", and pressed it on his colleagues in cabinet. [25] 
Tshekedi flew over to lobby Ismay, successfully, for the right to return to live in the 
Bangwato Reserve. In making this concession to Tshekedi, Ismay rode roughshod over the 
advice of his High Commissioner in Pretoria, who warned that "serious disorder" would 
follow Tshekedi's return. [26] An office minute by Clark on the first working day of 1952 
suggested that the CRO grasp the initiative from the Bangwato "before they have time to 
recover". Clark's view was reinforced later in the month by two developments at Serowe, 
one a shock and one a pleasure, which suggested that the time for action was approaching. 
The shock for the CRO, and particularly for the British government, assiduously hushed up 
from the public, was the unprecedented revolt of the Serowe district administration against 
British government policy. On 10 January 1952, three dismct officers at Serowe addressed a 
memorial to the Secretary of State protesting at the impending return of Tshekedi and at the 
injustice of British policy towards the Bangwato. The result was fury in higher quarters. 
Ismay, correctly, saw the connivance of other local colonial officials in the Serowe protest. 
Clark recognised that the root of the problem was the public cover-up of the real reasons for 
Seretse's banishment. [27] 
The pleasurable surprise for the CRO in early 1952 was hard evidence that Bangwato support 
for the "Keaboka crowd" was ebbing away. Following earlier hints by Tshekedi to Clark, 
five leading, young, educated Bangwato - Seretse's friends and strongest supporters - 
approached the temporary district commissioner at Serowe on 29 January. They strongly 
dissociated themselves from Keaboka et al, whom they characterized as corrupt, and called 
for democratic local government. On receiving this intelligence in London, Clark crowed: 
"at last the emergence of a third party" - and suggested it could be rallied to a "new deal" 
mbal administration under Rasebolai. [28] 
It was the "Keaboka crowd" that actually hamstrung itself in preparing for a grand delegation 
to London. It conceived the grand, secret and unrealistic strategy of getting Seretse to 
divorce his wife and thus ensure his return. It never told the Bangwato this, but Walter Pela 
blew the gaff to Seretse by a letter sent before the delegation arrived. Awareness of 
declining support made the "Keaboka crowd" all the more reckless. The British authorities 
watched all this with glee. The Pretoria office advised London to wait "for the enzymes to 
work" at eating away Keaboka's support. The only active voices in support of Keaboka 
seemed to come from the women of Mahalapye, who could be dismissed as marginal. [29] 
It was the imminent arrival of the Keaboka delegation in London which pushed the CRO into 
action. The timetable had been to announce Seretse's permanent banishment in July, once a 
tough new administrative regime was established in Bechuanaland. But the groundwork was 
almost ready, with new administrators in place and a promise of extra troops in emergency 
secured from the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. [30] On 18 March the new Secretary 
of State, Lord Salisbury, in process of taking over from Ismay, wrote to Churchill as PM: "I 
am in favour of grasping the nettle now." [3 l] 
Seretse's permanent banishment was contained in an Order-in-Council of 23 March, and was 
explained in Parliament on 27 March. Ismay broke the news to Seretse in person but refused 
even to acknowledge the Keaboka delegation in London, while Salisbury received post-bags 
of mail, mostly hostile and sometimes vitriolic, from the British public. [32] 
Conclusion 
The Keoboka delegation returned home empty-handed, without any convincing explanations. 
The Bangwato at Serowe were now baited by continuous breaches of faith to beyond 
breaking-point. But, once they had broken into murderous fury, they were shocked and silent 
at their own excess. As military reinforcements poured in from Southern Rhodesia and the 
"Keaboka crowd", there was bewilderment and apprehension. As the Johannesburg Star 
correspondent remarked four days after the riot: "the fight now seems to have been knocked 
out of the Barnangwato". [33] 
The political crisis following from Seretse's deposition and banishment blew the lid off 
developments in Barnangwato country. It revealed underlying tensions between sections in 
politics and society, and the drama of the Serowe kgotla riot acted as a catharsis of violent 
frustrations. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the Bangwato succession crisis of 1948-53 was an 
acceleration of the gradual "transmutation" of Botswana politics from tribalism in districts to 
nationalism in the country as a whole. [34] That much can be seen in the history of political 
ideas in Botswana between 1931 and 1965. [35] But such political arguments focus only on 
the political elite, who took no direct part in the Serowe kgotla riot of 1952. The historical 
significance of the riot is that it reveals underlying developments in wider society - the 
"tibe" becoming a "nation" in terms of class, gender and race. 
The race issue can be seen in the Serowe Kgotla riot in the clash of black assertion and white 
authority. In this there are obvious affinities with the contemporaneous history of 
neighbouring countries in southern Africa. Issues of gender are raised by the new female 
assertiveness before and during the riot, though it was a new, broader voice for society as a 
whole rather than for women alone. Questions of gender lead on to questions of "class", in 
that women expressed the interests of rural households from which so many men had become 
alienated by patterns of labour migration, which articulated Botswana society into the 
regional economy of southern Africa. Questions of "class" formation are also raised by the 
competition for feudal dues and property between Tshekedi's followers and the "frustrated 
feudalists" led by Keaboka, and by the aspirations of the new, educated elite for liberty and 
the pursuit of property. Far from being an island at this stage, Botswana was part of the 
troubled sea, with a history of "peasant" and female resistance and of a rising "petty 
bourgeoisie9' parallel to neighbouring areas of South Africa and Zimbabwe. [36] 
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